To provide reliable connection management, a transport protocol uses 3-way handshakes in which user incarnations are identi ed by bounded incarnation numbers from some modulo-N space. Cacheing schemes have been proposed to reduce the 3-way handshake to a 2-way handshake, providing the minimumlatency desired for transaction-oriented applications. In this paper, we de ne a class of cacheing protocols and determine the minimum N and optimal cache residency time as a function of real-time constraints (e.g. message lifetime, incarnation creation rate, inactivity duration, etc.). The protocols use the client-server architecture and handle failures and recoveries. Both clients and servers generate incarnation numbers from a local counter (e.g. clock). These protocols assume a maximum duration for each incarnation; without this assumption, there is a very small probability ( 1 N 2 ) of misinterpretation of incarnation numbers. This restriction can be overcome with some additional cacheing.
Introduction
The transport layer in a computer network consists of clients and servers, collectively referred to as entities. 1 We assume that entities can send messages to each other over channels that can lose, reorder, and duplicate messages; this is the typical network service available to the transport layer. Entities and channels can fail and recover. An entity failure is fail-stop; the state of the entity is lost except for stable storage. A channel failure means that the probability of message delivery becomes negligible, i.e. even with retransmissions a message is not delivered within a speci ed time.
Clients can open and close connections to servers and exchange data over connections. A server can either accept or reject an incoming connection request. (Rejection can occur because the server is inactive (as in a TCP server that is \closed" rather than \listening") or does not have adequate resources to accept new requests.) Between any client-server pair there is at most one connection at any moment. This allows a client (server) to have multiple connections open at the same time, with di erent servers (clients). This is a very general model, which subsumes, for example, the \well-known socket" architecture. Clients and servers typically represent user-level processes within hosts. But they may also represent hosts, with one client and server for each host.
Note that the same client-server pair can undergo many connections over time. We refer to each connection attempt of an entity, whether client or server, as a new incarnation of the entity. The notion of incarnations is essential for expressing desired correctness properties, e.g. a client incarnation becomes open to at most one server incarnation. (Incarnations and correctness properties are de ned precisely below.)
Traditional transport protocols, including the well-known TCP 8] and TP4 6] , identify successive incarnations by increasing (though not necessarily successive) incarnation numbers from some modulo-N space 2 . This means that the protocol must be designed to avoid misinterpretable incarnation numbers, i.e. an incarnation number of one incarnation being interpreted by an entity (client or server) as representing a di erent incarnation.
Another feature of traditional transport protocols is that an entity stores a remote incarnation's number only while it is connected to the remote incarnation. This necessitates a 3-way handshake for connection establishment 8, 10] . A client that wants to connect to a server sends a connection request with its incarnation number, say x. When the server receives this, it responds by sending a response containing x and a server incarnation number, say y. When the client receives the 1 Actually, clients and servers are the users of the transport layer, and for each user there is an entity in the transport layer. But for notational brevity, we use \entity" (and \client" and \server") to refer to both the user and the associated entity. 2 In TCP, incarnation numbers are referred to as initial sequence numbers. The delay incurred by the 3-way handshake is unacceptable for many transaction-oriented applications such as RPCs. Note that although transaction data can be sent with a connection request, the server cannot process the transaction until it con rms that this is a new request. This has motivated the development of minimum-latency transport protocols, where the server can determine the \newness" of a connection request as soon as it is received. This is equivalent to achieving connection establishment with a 2-way handshake.
To achieve this, the server has to retain information about clients even when it is not connected to them. In the above 3-way handshake between client incarnation x and server incarnation y, notice that if the server had remembered the incarnation number, say z, that the client had previously used when it connected to the server, then the server could have determined that the connection request with x was new (because x > z). In that case, it could have become open at once; i.e. a 2-way handshake would su ce. A server cannot be expected to inde nitely remember the last incarnation number of every client to which it was connected, due to the enormous number of clients in a typical internetwork. However, a cacheing scheme is feasible, and several have been proposed (e.g. 5]), culminating recently in a proposed modi cation to TCP 2] .
In this paper, we de ne a cache-based transport protocol and determine the relationship between various parameters (N, message lifetime, incarnation creation rate, inactivity duration, cache residency times, etc.) that ensures correct operation. The protocol uses an incarnation number generator that is periodically saved on (fail-proof) stable storage. We determine the optimal cache residency time for client incarnation numbers, which ensures minimum latency for every connection establishment. This optimal duration depends upon the message lifetime. Client incarnation numbers can be purged from the cache before this time; the only penalty is that connection establishment for such clients reduces to the traditional 3-way handshake for a period equal to the optimal duration.
Another approach to minimum-latency transport protocols is provided by so-called timer-based mechanisms (e.g. SCMP 7] , Delta-t 4, 11], VMTP 3]). Here also, a server is required to maintain per-client information for a certain duration that depends on message lifetime. However if the entry is purged before this time, there is no backup 3-way handshake. Thus the cache-based approach may have a signi cant advantage in wide-area situations where only large loose bounds on message lifetime are available. (See Section 6.)
There is an intricate relationship between the modulo-N space of the incarnation numbers and the handshaking algorithms. Most references in the literature seem to assume that misinterpretable incarnation numbers (often referred to as \wrap-around") are avoided if N 2L=
where is the minimum time between incarnation creations at an entity, and L is the maximum message lifetime imposed by the channels.
In fact, we shall show that this condition is not adequate. Consider the messages in transit from, say, a client to a server. The condition does ensure that messages sent by di erent client incarnations have di erent client incarnation numbers. Thus the client can correctly interpret these client incarnation numbers, because it knows the highest incarnation number, say z, that it has sent. But it does not ensure that the server can correctly interpret these client incarnation numbers, because the server, unless it is already connected to the client, may have an old incarnation number of the client, say y. The server interprets received client incarnation numbers with respect to y; and the di erence between y and z is not necessarily bound by the message lifetime. Furthermore, the server may send messages containing y to the client, and the above condition does not ensure that the client can correctly interpret these numbers.
With any connection management mechanism, unless a bound is placed on the lifetime of an incarnation (or equivalently, a connection), it is possible to misinterpret incarnation numbers and incorrectly open a connection. In the case of 3-way handshake protocols, the probability of this is negligible for any reasonable value of N because an incarnation becomes open only when a received incarnation number equals a local incarnation number. However in the case of 2-way handshake protocols, whether cache-based or timer-based, the probability can become signi cant because equality testing at the server is now replaced by comparison testing (i.e. is the cached number less than the received number?). Our cacheing protocol achieves the same low probability in both 2-way and 3-way handshakes (by not using cached entries that are \too old").
In the following subsections, we de ne desired correctness properties and summarize our contributions.
Correctness properties
We rst make precise the notion of incarnations. Recall that the transport layer consists of a set of entities, partitioned into clients and servers. Every entity has a unique id.
An incarnation of a client is started whenever the client requests a connection to any server. An incarnation of a server is started whenever the server accepts a (potentially new) connection request from any client. Every incarnation is assigned an incarnation number when it starts; the incarnation is uniquely distinguished by its incarnation number and entity id.
Once an incarnation x of an entity a is started in an attempt to connect to an entity b, it has one of two possible futures (based on messages it receives):
(1) At some point x becomes open and acquires an incarnation number y of some incarnation of b (in short we say x becomes open to incarnation y of b); at some later point x becomes closed.
(2) The other possibility is that x becomes closed without ever becoming open.
Because an incarnation becomes open to at most one incarnation, this ensures \at-most-once" semantics; i.e. impossibility of two remote incarnations y and z that are both open to x.
A client incarnation closes without becoming open either because its connection request was rejected by the server or because of failure (in the server, the client, or the channels). A server incarnation closes without becoming open either because of failure or because it was started in response to a connection request that later turns out to be a duplicate request from some old (now Progress: If an incarnation x of a client requests a connection to a server, then a connection is established between x and an incarnation of the server within some speci ed time, provided the server does not reject x's request and neither client, server nor channels fail within that time.
Terminating handshakes: An entity cannot stay inde nitely in a state (or set of states)
where it is repeatedly sending messages (expecting a response that never arrives). (Such \in nite chatter" is worse than deadlock because in addition to not making progress, the protocol is consuming precious network resources.)
Our contribution
In this paper, we specify a class of cacheing protocols and obtain the relationship between various parameters that ensures correctness and minimum-latency performance. Channels can lose, reorder, and duplicate messages, and entities and channels can fail and recover (as described at the beginning of Section 1). In our protocols, each server caches the latest incarnation numbers of client incarnations that have connected to the server. Connection establishment is achieved in a 2-way (3-way) handshake if an entry for the requesting client is (is not) found in the cache. Connection closing and connection request rejection is achieved by a 2-way handshake. In addition to data transfer with the connection establishment phase, there is also a data transfer phase which can use any of the typical data-transfer mechanisms (e.g. sliding window). Closing can be merged with connection establishment, resulting in a connection consisting entirely of a single 2-way or 3-way handshake.
Each entity (client and server) has a maximum \wait" duration. If a response is outstanding for longer than that duration, it assumes failure (of the remote entity or channels) and aborts the connection. 3 Each entity also has a minimum wait duration; a response must be outstanding for at least this duration before the entity can abort. When a failed client recovers, it can request a new connection after waiting a minimum recovery time. Thus it is possible for a server connected to client to receive a connection request from the client with a higher incarnation number (if the client failed, recovered, and issued a new request). In that case, the server closes its current incarnation and (optionally) can start a new connection with a new incarnation. The same can happen to the client: if the server fails, recovers, receives an old duplicate connection request and responds to it; when the client receives the response, it closes its current incarnation and (optionally) can start a new connection with a new incarnation.
Our protocols can accommodate any size of the server cache, including no cache at all. However, if an entry is cached, then it must be cached for a minimum time (unless the server crashes), otherwise correctness can be violated; it can be ushed out any time after that but before a maximum cache residency time. The cache can be lost in a crash at any time.
Ideally, a server's cache should be large enough to store the latest incarnation number of every client that has connected to the server for a period of the maximum message lifetime plus client wait duration. In this case, the 3-way handshake can be eliminated entirely.
In our class of protocols, denoted SC (for Server-Cache), each entity has an incarnation number generator which provides the incarnation numbers for local incarnations. The generator cycles through successive modulo-N values. We assume that successive values of the generator are sep-arated by at least seconds, and that this su ces for successive incarnations to have di erent incarnation numbers (i.e. at least seconds elapses between incarnation creations at the entity). Thus the generator can be a counter that is incremented by 1 for each new incarnation. It can also be a real-time clock with maximum rate of one tick every seconds.
We assume that periodically, once every seconds, the value of the generator is saved in stable (fail-proof) storage. If an entity crashes, then it must wait a minimum \recovery time" that is at least seconds before it can request a new connection (otherwise correctness can be violated).
Upon recovery, the generator is set to the saved value plus = . This ensures that crashes do not falsify our above assumption about the generator. Di erent entities can have di erent 's.
We rst show that the correctness conditions are satis ed if and only if the following timing constraints hold:
(T1) c S > W C and r S > W C and w C > W S and r C > W S and r C > C and r S > S where -W C (W S ) is the maximum wait duration for the client (server).
-w C (w S ) is the minimum wait duration for the client (server); w C W C and w S W S . 4 -c S is the minimum duration of an entry in the server cache (barring crashes).
-r C (r S ) is the minimum recovery time for the client (server).
-S ( C ) is the time between saves to the server's (client's) stable storage.
T1 is the only constraint we place on the minimum cache residency time, the minimum recovery delays, and the minimum wait times. It is worth pointing out that T1 does not depend upon message or incarnation lifetimes.
To illustrate the necessity of T1, suppose that the third condition does not hold, i.e. w C < W S .
Then the following is possible (see Figure 8 number generator. -L is the maximum message lifetime in a channel.
-C S is the maximum duration of an entry in the server cache; we assume C S > L + W C . 5 -I is the maximum duration of an incarnation. For many purposes, I is much greater than W C and W S , and the above bound can be approximated by N 2L+ max(C S ; I). Note that the constraint on N, N 2L, is too small to guarantee a correct connection.
If a server stores the incarnation number of a client for at least L+W C seconds and there has been no crash for at least L + W C seconds, then all connections with that client can be opened through 2-way handshakes. That is, if there is no cache entry for an incoming connection request of that client, then it is guaranteed to be a new one (and the server can become open at once). 6 In particular, if we make the (admittedly unrealistic) assumption that the cache is never lost in crashes, we can obtain a much simpler special case of the SC protocol that uses only 2-way handshakes.
The only drawback with the SC protocols is N's dependence on I, if one is concerned about exceedingly long-lived incarnations, say, of the order of days. If we assume that the probability of two successive connections having identical modulo-N client and server incarnation numbers is negligible (this probability is the same as for 3-way handshakes and is 1 N 2 under reasonable assumptions of incarnation lifetimes), then the following bound which does not depend on I su ces:
For those situations where this probability is not negligible, we can completely eliminate the I constraint by using an additional cache, referred to as a Lin-generator cache, at either the server or the client (or both). The entity with the generator cache, say a, stores its own incarnation number from its previous connection with the other entity, say b, for at least 2L seconds. When a is next involved in a connection (or connection attempt) with b, if its generator cache contains an entry for b, it uses an incarnation number one higher than the entry; otherwise, it uses an arbitrary incarnation number. We require the admittedly unrealistic assumption that the generator cache is not lost in crashes, unlike the usual server cache. Given such a generator cache, T2' ensures correct interpretation of incarnation numbers, and hence correct operation.
We believe the above results are applicable to TP4 and TCP, because our SC protocols (without 5 C S < L + W C results in suboptimal performance, as we see below. 6 W C seconds after the server caches the client incarnation number, say x, the client no longer sends any connection request with incarnation number x; after another L seconds, no such connection request would be in the channels. cacheing) use basically the same handshakes as TP4 and TCP 7 . In our protocol as speci ed, only the client can close a connection; however it is straightforward to add messages for the server to request closing and to achieve graceful closing (where each side must issue a close). Our incarnation numbers correspond to TCP's initial sequence numbers; TCP usually generates them from a clock. The fact that TCP uses the same sequence number space for connection management messages and data bytes is irrelevant. Performance functions such as ow control, slow start, etc., are orthogonal to the correctness problem. There are some di erences between our protocol and TCP (e.g. in the use of reject and disconnect messages), but we believe that they do not a ect the handshakes.
Organization of paper
In Section 2, we specify a protocol SC1, which assumes unbounded incarnation numbers, and prove that it satis es the correctness conditions. In Section 3, we rst prove that the unbounded incarnation numbers in SC1 satisfy certain bounds with respect to their intended receivers. Based on these bounds, we modify SC1 to use modulo-N incarnation numbers, resulting in protocol SC2. In Section 4, we obtain a simpli ed protocol SC3, which eliminates 3-way handshakes entirely. In Section 5, we present the Lin-generator cache. Section 6 contains concluding remarks and a comparison with timer-based approaches. Details of proofs are in two Appendices.
Protocol SC1: Unbounded Incarnation Numbers
Every entity (client and server) has a local incarnation number generator that supplies incarnation numbers for local incarnations. The generator goes through successive values separated by at least seconds. Successive incarnations obtain di erent (and not necessarily consecutive) incarnation numbers. Thus, the generator can be a counter or a real-time clock. We assume that periodically, once every seconds, the value of the generator is saved in stable (fail-proof) storage.
Consider a client-server pair. The server caches an incarnation number x of a client in two ways: (1) if it becomes open to client incarnation x as a result of a 3-way handshake; and (2) if it receives a connection request from the client with incarnation number x when its cache has a value y < x (whether or not the server accepts the request). In both cases, the cacheing of x signi es that the server has not connected previously to incarnation x or to any later incarnation of the client.
The server does not need to remember the value x after L + W C seconds since cacheing x. This is because any connection request received after that time comes from a later incarnation to which the server can open at once 8 . In fact, we require that it not use the value x after this time, 7 Ignoring TCP's balanced connection establishment, a feature which apparently is not used in practice. 8 W C seconds after the server caches x, the client no longer sends any connection request with incarnation number otherwise incorrect operation can result 9 ; intuitively, x remaining too long in the cache is similar to x remaining too long in the channels. Thus after this time, the server just needs to remember that L + W C seconds have elapsed since the cache was updated. Note that it must remember this much; otherwise it would not be able to distinguish this situation from a post-crash period when the cache is lost and a 3-way handshake is needed. There are various ways to manage the cache. To describe them, we de ne a (hypothetical) cache entry for every client. The entry equals the incarnation number of the client incarnation which last connected (or attempted to connect) to the server provided this occurred less than C S (> L + W C ) seconds ago; or the special value old, signifying that at least L + W C seconds have elapsed since the entry was assigned an incarnation number; or the special value nil, signifying that nothing is known about the last connection attempt by the client. A 2-way handshake can be used in the rst two cases, and a 3-way handshake is needed in the last case.
One way to manage the cache is to store only entries of the rst and second type, i.e. incarnation numbers and old entries. Whenever the cache becomes too large, some client entry is removed, i.e. set to nil. This approach has maximum exibility in that any cache replacement policy can be used and both incarnation numbers and old entries can be ejected.
Another way to manage the cache is to never discard incarnation number entries unless there is a crash. Therefore an entry can be nil only after a crash and that too only for L+W C seconds. Thus we can purge old and nil values from the cache provided we remember (in a separate variable) whether a crash recovery has taken place less than L +W C seconds ago. If it has, a 3-way handshake is used when there is no cache entry; in all other cases a 2-way handshake is used.
Convention: Throughout, we use a to range over client ids and b to range over server ids.
For clarity, we assume that the incarnation number generator goes through consecutive integers 0; 1; . We next describe the messages exchanged between clients and servers. Each message is of the form (M; sid; rid; sin; rin), where M is the type of the message, sid is the sender's id, rid is the intended receiver's id, sin is the sender's incarnation number, and rin is the intended receiver's incarnation number. In some messages, sin or rin may be absent. For notational brevity,
we have omitted the optional data elds in messages, and messages related to the data transfer phase. 10 (Concerning the analysis of misinterpretable incarnation numbers, data transfer messages are equivalent to the DR and DRACK messages de ned below.) 10 Such messages contain all the elds mentioned above and additional elds such as sliding window sequence numbers and size. It is trivial to add the data transfer function to the connection management protocol de ned here 9].
Each message is either a primary message or a secondary message. A primary message is sent repeatedly 11 until a response is received or the maximum wait duration has elapsed. A secondary message is sent only in response to the reception of a primary message. Note that the response to a primary message may be another primary message (as in a 3-way handshake).
We There are two types of events. A \nonreceive" event has an enabling condition (ec) and an action (ac); the action can be executed whenever the event is enabled. A receive event for a message has only an action; it is executed whenever the message is received. We assume that LinGen is incremented by one between successive reads (by an event not shown). We use abbreviations like sin > Cache b (a) 6 2 fnil; oldg to denote Cache b (a) 6 2 fnil; oldg^sin > Cache b (a).
Failure model: An entity (client or server) can fail and recover at any time. All state information except for stable storage is lost in a failure, and no events are executed while failed. Upon recovery, the entity reinitializes the Status, Lin and Din for every remote entity, and sets LinGen to the value in stable storage plus = . The channels can fail and recover at any time. When the channels are not failed, a primary message is delivered and its response received within the primary message sender's maximum wait time (the channels can still lose, reorder, and duplicate messages). The proof of Lemma is in Appendix B. The above bounds are tight. That is, for each bound, if the bound is made any tighter, there is a behavior, easily obtained by exploiting the worst-case real-time constraints, that will violate it (Appendix B illustrates this for the upper bound in (a)).
We obtain protocol SC2 by replacing the unbounded incarnation numbers in protocol SC1 by Typically, I is also much greater than L and C S , and the above bound simpli es to N I For example, if we use 32-bit incarnation numbers (N = 2 32 ) and assume a maximum incarnation generation rate of 10 4 incarnations per second, then the above bound requires incarnation lifetimes to be less than 100 hours.
Observe from Lemma 1 that the I constraint enters the bound T2 through the DR and DRACK messages. In each of these messages, when an entity receives the message it tests for sin = Din^rin = Lin. Thus, misinterpretation can occur only if client and server incarnation numbers in the current connection are exactly the same as client and server incarnation numbers in the previous (long-lived) connection. The probability of this is very low. Speci cally, the probability that the client's new incarnation number equals its old incarnation number is approximately 1 N , assuming that the duration of an incarnation is uniformly random. The corresponding probability for the server is also approximately 1 N under similar assumptions. Thus the overall probability is at most 1 N , and approximately 1 N 2 if the start times of the client and server incarnations are independent.
If we are willing to live with this probability of misinterpretation, then we get the following To avoid this, we require that successive connection attempts by the client to the server (or by the server to the client) be identi ed with \close-by" incarnation numbers. One obvious way to do this is for one of the entities (or both) to cache its incarnation number from its previous connection with the other entity, for at least 2L seconds. We refer to this as a Lin-generator cache.
When an entity with a Lin-generator cache becomes involved in a connection attempt with a remote entity, it obtains its local incarnation number as follows: if its Lin-generator cache contains an entry for the remote entity, it uses an incarnation number one higher than the entry; otherwise, it uses an arbitrary incarnation number. 
Conclusions
We have presented a transport protocol that uses server cacheing to achieve 2-way handshake connection establishment, providing the minimum latency needed for transaction-oriented users such as RPCs. When no cache entry is available, the protocol degenerates to 3-way handshakes. By having a su ciently large cache, 3-way handshakes can be eliminated entirely, i.e. if cache entries are retained for L + W C seconds. Our protocols tolerate crashes, assuming a stable storage that is periodically updated with the current value of the incarnation number generator. If the server cache is lost, then 3-way handshakes have to be used until L + W C seconds elapses. Upon recovery an entity is subjected to only a brief delay, i.e. the maximum wait duration of the other entity; this delay does not depend on message or incarnation lifetimes.
Note that there is a distinction between message lifetime (L) and message delay. The lifetime is the maximum duration for which a message may survive, whereas the delay is the average time for a message to go from sender to receiver. The delay is less than the lifetime, sometimes by several orders especially in internetworks. Certainly W C should be larger than twice the delay but it can be much less than the lifetime.
Our protocol uses modulo-N numbers to identify incarnations. We have obtained the minimum value of N that guarantees correct operation. To our knowledge, no such bound has been previously presented in the general setting we have considered. Unlike other cacheing protocols proposed 2], our protocol does not use a cache entry if it is older than the maximum message lifetime plus maximum client wait duration. This is key to ensuring that even if N does not satisfy the lower bound with respect to maximum incarnation lifetime, the probability of misinterpretation is very low.
Timer-based techniques provide another approach for achieving minimum-latency connectionestablishment 1, 11, 4, 7, 3] . Here also, a server is required to maintain information on each client it has served for a certain duration. The duration is roughly comparable to the optimal duration in our cache-based mechanism (the major component in both is the message lifetime).
In most timer-based protocols, if a client's entry is removed before the speci ed duration (e.g. due to a crash or memory limitation), then the server can incorrectly accept old connection requests of that client. SCMP 7] is an exception: by assuming synchronized clocks, it maintains correctness but it may reject new connections for a period of time depending on clock skews and other parameters. In any case, timer-based approaches do not have a back-up 3-way handshake.
Thus one advantage of the cache-based mechanism is that it provides a 3-way handshake as back-up whenever the 2-way is not possible. This allows the server to implement di erent cachereplacement policies that adapt to varying client and internetwork characteristics. This should be particularly convenient for wide-area internetworks where only large loose bounds on message lifetime may be available. Other than this qualitatively important di erence, it appears di cult to compare the cache-based and timer-based approaches without a quantitative performance evaluation.
We point out that the incarnation lifetime, which appears in our lower bound for N, does not usually show up in the analyses of timer-based mechanisms. This is because these analyses assume that clock values are unbounded. This is not really a reasonable assumption if one is concerned about correctness. Every protocol has clock values that come from a modulo-N space because messages have a xed number of bits for the clock value. One can argue that N is very large and can be assumed unbounded. If so, that assumption would be equally valid for cache-based protocols and would enormously simplify the analysis almost to the point of triviality. But more to the point, such an assumption may be invalid for very high speed networks (i.e. very small ). When y sent the CRR, say at time u 1 , it was opening to x and its cache entry for a was nil. Assume another incarnation z was previously open to x. Suppose it became open at u 2 (t 1 u 2 u 1 t 2 ). At u 1 , z was closed and no entry for a remained in the cache. 12 If b did not crash between u 2 and u 1 , we have u 1 > u 2 + c S (because x stays in cache for at least c S seconds).
If b did crash between u 2 and u 1 , we have u 1 > u 2 +r S (because b does not respond to connection requests for at least r S seconds after recovery).
In either case, because of the timing constraint T1 (and t 1 u 2 u 1 t 2 ), we have t 2 t 1 +W C .
Thus x would be closed before t 2 . Contradiction. Part (a) of Lemma 1 follows from condition (2).
Note: These bounds are tight because equality is possible with each of the inequalities above.
For the upper bound in (2), the following scenario is possible. The (CR; a; b; sin) received at time t 1 has sin = l 1 , i.e. it was sent just before time t 1 
